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Modern social psychology has incorporated into the li erature a number of theories and 
effects that were highly counter-intuitive at the time they were introduced, yet have 
formed a body of literature claiming to demonstrate these effects.  Unconscious Thought 
Theory (UTT) was developed as a novel take on complex decision-making that aligned 
with folk wisdom advising people to “sleep on it” when tasked with an important choice 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  After being exposed to “better” or “worse” attributions 
regarding a number of stimulus items, participants either immediately made a choice, 
waited 3 minutes, or performed a distraction task.  Participants in the last condition 
performed significantly better, providing a basis for UTT.  Following the publication of 
the original work, a number of replications and nonreplications have been published 
attempting to pin down the phenomena, with varying de rees of success.  To correct 
methodological shortcomings in other work, 57 participants rated the importance of a 
number of attributes that were then attached to a number of choice alternatives, then 
engaged in one of the three thought conditions.  When correcting for participant weights, 
those in the conscious thought condition performed ost in alignment with their stated 
preferences, but the relationship was insignificant.  Without correcting for participant 
weights the effect of the condition was marginally significant, identical to the original 
results (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  This demonstrates that e UTT is not a good basis to go 
about understanding human cognition. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Folk wisdom states that when tasked with a particularly difficult problem, it is 
oftentimes useful to step away from the problem for a short period of time and return to it 
in order to look at it with “fresh eyes.” More often than not, when faced with a difficult 
decision regarding life choices, my parents would te l me to “sleep on it,” a strategy I still 
employ to this day.  Similarly, while distracted or accomplishing some task unrelated to 
the previous problem, people have epiphanies in which it seems as though a light bulb 
has come on, the solution suddenly illuminated, distinguishing it from the normal 
cacophony of mental noise.  These phenomena are different but interrelated, as both 
require a period of inactivity or distracted activity for the full force of one’s mental 
acumen to be put to good use.  In these scenarios something is happening for these 
cognitions to eventually bubble up to the surface of consciousness; were nothing 
happening it is unlikely that the solution to the problem would be so readily arrived at 
when it was previously inaccessible.  Rarely is thistrategy applied to important 
decisions made in life.  Instead, a common refrain offered by teachers, mentors, parents, 
and life coaches when faced with a difficult choice is to make a list of pros and cons, 
evaluate and weigh them, compare the totals, and then make a decision.   
This type of reasoned cost-benefit analysis may appe r to be the most effective 
way to make a decision, but some doubts have persist d throughout the history of 
psychology.  Early psychoanalytic practitioners, Sigmund Freud included, believed that 
the unconscious held the keys to the mental kingdom, with decisions from the 




unconscious has changed significantly over the course of a century, however, as have the 


















Chapter 2: Unconscious-Conscious to Automatic-Controlled 
  The artificial dichotomization between conscious and unconscious mental life is 
older than the discipline of psychology, described y Freud in some of his earliest works 
(1915/1964).  As a physician he was primarily concer ed with pathology, and his 
research (a term used broadly in this case) pointed to the unconscious as a primary source 
of mental anguish.  In his description, the unconscious contained all the instincts, drives, 
and urges that exist outside of awareness yet still affect behavior, and when people 
experience mental distress the root of the problem often lay within this largely hidden 
psychic construct (Freud, 1917/1964).  Included within he unconscious is the 
preconscious, existing somewhere between the conscious and unconscious mind.  In this 
paradigm, the unconscious produced the best decisions, and then transferred them into the 
preconscious where the conscious mind could gain access to it in some disguised form.  
These decisions could then be uncovered through the psychoanalytic techniques proffered 
by Freud and others.  Modern understandings of the unconscious have changed 
considerably, as Freudian techniques and analysis gave way to a more scientific 
understanding of the human psyche.  Thus, the unconsci us-conscious paradigm was 
replaced by the more testable automatic-controlled paradigm. 
 To better differentiate between the natures of the “conscious mind” and 
“unconscious mind,” psychologists developed new terminology surrounding automatic 
behavioral phenomena.  Too much of the Freudian terminology presupposed the 
existence of constructs that were unfalsifiable, and thus a new, more specific terminology 
was required.  In place of the “unconscious mind” came automatic processes, initially 




controlled processes (Bargh, 1982; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).  The understanding of 
automaticity changed over the following years, and began to be evaluated along four 
dimensions: awareness, efficiency, intention, and control.  An action is automatic if the 
individual acting has no awareness he/she is doing it, are doing it with minimal cognitive 
resources, have no intention to do it, or cannot con rol it (Andersen, Moskowitz, Blair & 
Nosek, 2007).  The degree and type of automaticity var based on how highly the action 
is measured on each of these dimensions, resulting in a continuum of automaticity rather 
than discrete categories of “automatic” and “controlled” (Bargh, 1994).  As a result, a 
broad section of observable phenomena are explored within automaticity, such as priming 

















Chapter 3: Unconscious Thought Theory 
For the purposes of this model, conscious thought is defined as “cognitive and/or 
affective task-relevant processes one is consciously aware of while attending to a task,” 
whereas unconscious thought “refers to cognitive and/or affective task-relevant processes 
that take place outside conscious awareness” (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  This distinction 
between the two types of thought comprises the consci u -unconscious principle.  
Although unconscious mental processes affect decisions, memory, and appraisals, these 
processes are generally only capable of performing relatively simple cognitive tasks 
(Greenwald, 1992).  Alternatively, Unconscious Thought Theory proposed a new type of 
automatic process that could effectively register and respond to stimuli in an efficient, 
bias-free manner without any conscious involvement.  Conscious thought can also be 
thought of as thought with attention, whereas as “unconscious thought” is thought 
without attention (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  Within this understanding is the core 
component of Unconscious Thought Theory: that what we call conscious processing is 
simply processing that is occurring constantly thatwe are then attending to, a spotlight on 
a running stream of consciousness.  Unbound by the capacity and schematic constraints 
of conscious thought, unconscious thought would be abl to “naturally” weigh the 
relative importance of far more information than conscious thought and arrive at a 
normatively better decision.   
To illustrate this, a number of methodologically similar experiments compared the 
effects of conscious thought and “unconscious thougt” when participants were faced 
with complex decision-making tasks (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & 




attributes about four different objects, among which one was a normatively better option.  
If each choice-alternative had 12 attributions, onebj ct would have 4 negative 
attributions and 8 positive attributions, one would have 6 negative and 6 positive 
attributions, and one would have 8 negative attribuions and 4 positive attributions.  A 
pilot study examining the attributions used eliminated attributions with extreme valence, 
leaving one option objectively better than the other ree.  Post hoc analysis further 
validated this assertion by overall examining prefer nce probabilities for presented 
alternatives (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  Participants were ither asked to make a decision 
immediately after viewing stimulus and without delib ration, consciously deliberate for a 
number of minutes and then make a decision (consciou  thought condition), or perform a 
distraction task for a number of minutes and then make a decision (“unconscious 
thought” condition). 
With little variation, individuals in the immediate decision condition performed 
worst, with those in the conscious thought condition d ing better, and the “unconscious 
thought” condition performing the best, as measured by the percentage of the sample that 
chose the normatively best alternative (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, 
& van Baaren, 2006; Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2006).  Proponents claim this 
demonstrates processing occurred without attention, thus freeing the mind to make 
determinations based on objective observations rathe  than expectancies created in 
conscious thought.  The ability to make better decisions following a period of distracted 
deliberation was termed the Unconscious Thought Effect (UTE, formerly the 
deliberation-without-attention effect).  The five additional principles of Unconscious 




bottom-up-versus-top-down principle, the weighting principle, the rule principle, and the 
convergence-versus-divergence principle (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  These 
principles describe a difference between the functio ing of conscious and unconscious 
thought, and each principle has a number of corollaries. 
The Capacity Principle 
 The capacity principle states that conscious thought can contain a limited quantity 
of information (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  Working memory, a proxy for the 
capacity of conscious thought, holds approximately s ven items, +/- two (Miller, 1956).  
Although follow-up research has revised and clarified the capacity of working memory 
(Schiffrin & Nosofsky, 1994; Cowan, 2001), the very fact that it is limited is enough to 
demonstrate that conscious thought has a capacity significantly lower than the total 
volume of input we receive from the world.  This limited capacity causes errors in 
judgment when engaging in decision tasks, and has been observed to have a negative 
impact on the ability of individuals to make unbiased, accurate assessments (Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991; Kahneman, 2003).  Decision-making theories have long had to take into 
account the limited quantity of accessible information in order to predict decision-task 
outcomes, with the rationality of decisions bound by the quantity and the quality of 
information that created those judgments.  As a result, models of bounded rationality 
have observed that decisions are often made intuitively (Kahneman, 2003), but from 
where does this intuition arise? 
For proponents of UTT, “unconscious thought” does not have the same capacity 
limitations that often preclude optimal outcomes from coming to bear.  Individuals 




were able to sort and cluster information in a way that allowed more correct decisions to 
be made (59%) than either the conscious-deliberation (47%) or immediate-choice (36%) 
conditions (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  As the number of attributions is far more than the 
capacity of any individual’s working memory, the hig er number of correct decisions 
resulted from utilizing the entirety of the evidenc rather than just the snapshot that 
conscious thought can view.  If “unconscious thought” has the same capacity limitations 
as conscious thought, participants would have performed equally in the conscious thought 
and “unconscious thought” conditions. 
The Bottom-Up-versus-Top-Down Principle  
 The bottom-up-versus-top-down principle describes conscious thought as working 
schematically, from a top-down perspective, with “unconscious thought” working 
aschematically, from a bottom-up perspective (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  When 
cognitive resources are constrained, individuals mut rely more upon schemas and the 
expectancies those schemas generate to make judgments about the world (Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994).  Given that cognitive resources 
in conscious thought are necessarily constrained relativ  to unconscious thought (as per 
the capacity principle), individuals engaged in conscious thought are more likely to 
employ biased judgments that emphasize the content of a preexisting schema over the 
content of presented stimuli.  When individuals engaged in a person-memory task were 
presented with instructions designed to prime stereo ype activations when evaluating 
another individual, conscious thought produced more biased judgments than did 




information in integrated using bottom-up processes absent schematization, resulting in a 
more objective appraisal based on naturalistic weightin  schemes.   
The Weighting Principle 
 The weighting principle claims that the unconscious is able to weight the relative 
importance of informational stimuli in an efficient objective manner, in comparison to 
conscious thought that produces more biased judgments (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006).  The bottom-up-versus-top-down principle tells us that conscious thought is 
schema-guided, and this process generates new cognitions that are consistent with 
schemas, blocks cognitions inconsistent with schemas, and reinterprets stimuli or 
cognitions to make them more consistent with schemas (González-Vallejo, Lassiter, 
Bellezza, & Lindberg, 2008).  “Unconscious thought” is not schema-guided, and as a
result is able to avoid the expectancies that these sch mas create.   Participants tasked 
with selecting among potential roommates first rated the importance of various attributes, 
with the desirability of each roommate option determined by the difference between the 
sum of the importance ratings for positive attributions and the sum of the importance 
ratings for negative attributions (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment 3).  Participants in the 
“unconscious thought” condition were more likely to choose the roommate that reflected 
their initial subjective weights than in either the conscious-deliberation condition or the 
immediate-choice condition, but differences between co ditions were not statistically 
significant.  In spite of this, the authors state that “unconscious thought” improves 
participants’ ability to make decisions in line with their personal system of weights, with 




the conditions were not statistically significant from one another, resulting in weak 
experimental support for this principle.   
The Rule Principle 
 The rule principle describes conscious thought as being able to follow strict rules 
and be precise, whereas “unconscious thought” is far more associative in nature 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  Experimental support for this principle offered by 
some proponents of UTT encompasses two studies, one in which participants were asked 
to perform an arithmetic task in conscious and distracted conditions and one in which 
participants were exposed to valenced terms (e.g. “bad”) and matched negations of the 
same term (e.g. “not bad”) (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001; Deutsch, 
Gawronski, & Strack, 2006).  Participants in both studies were determined to have been 
unable to follow the rules that dictated each process, as participants used neither 
arithmetic rules nor the rules of negation in the production of an output.  Instead, they 
arrived at rough estimates, and did not encode negated terms, encoding the non-negated 
terms instead.  This reportedly demonstrates that “unconscious thought” cannot deal with 
propositional rules, such as those found in arithmetic. 
Although participants in studies testing Unconscious Thought Theory also viewed 
negated attributions, participants received instructions indicating they would be 
evaluating and then selecting among a number of alterna ive options (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
The goal-mediated nature of the task purportedly produces the outcome, as unconscious 
thought is an automatic process initiated by relevant goal-states that activate habitually 
used processing systems (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000).  Thus, unconscious thought does 




In this way, the unconscious conforms to rules withou  using them (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006). 
The Convergence-Versus-Divergence Principle 
 The convergence-versus-divergence principle states hat conscious thought is 
focused and convergent, while “unconscious thought” is more divergent (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006).  Proponents of UTT attribute the incubation effect, a phenomenon in 
which participants produce more creative responses to a problem after a period of time in 
which the participant is distracted, to the divergent properties of “unconscious thought,” 
and offer some additional evidence regarding its productive nature.  The incubation effect 
occurs in participants performing the Remote Association Test (Smith & Blankenship, 
1991).  The Remote Association Test exposes participants to three words (e.g. arm, coal, 
peach) that can be combined with a fourth word (e.g. pit) so each forms a common word 
or phrase (e.g. armpit, coal pit, peach pit).  Participants in the incubation condition, in 
which they performed a distraction task prior to answering, were significantly more likely 
to produce the correct fourth word than those asked to make an immediate decision.  This 
result is due to functional fixedness present in the immediate choice condition that fades 
in the incubation condition, known as the forgetting-fixation hypothesis (Smith & 
Blankenship, 1989; Smith & Blankenship, 1991).  Proponents of UTT view incubation 
effects as demonstrative of “unconscious thought,” and a number of experiments show 
how participants experiencing a distracted deliberation condition produce a greater 
number of novel answers in comparison to the consciu  thought condition (Dijksterhuis 
& Meurs, 2006).  In experiments examining the incubation effect, effect sizes are fairly 




never explained how the tasks presented in experiments explicitly attempting to explore 
UTT are functionally different from examinations of fixation, a known phenomenon.  
However, for proponents of UTT this confers upon “uconscious thought” the property 
of divergence, in comparison to the convergence seen in conscious thought. 
 Investigators have performed multiple replications a d meta-analyses of 
Unconscious Thought Theory since the theory was published in 2006.  Many of these 
replications have utilized the same stimuli as the work of Dijksterhuis et al., while others 
have made modifications to improve the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn or 















Chapter 4: Replications and Meta-Analyses 
The foundation of any good science is replication, and novel theories generated 
by social psychology are no exception.  Daniel Kahneman’s 2012 letter urging a “daisy-
chain of replication” for social priming effects applies to all observable phenomena (D. 
Kahneman, personal communication, September 26, 2012) and Unconscious Thought 
Theory has been studied a number of times in an effort to replicate the original results.  
All replications used approximately the same methodol gy, with participants instructed 
to make a choice after viewing some information rega ding their options.  Information 
was presented in random order (e.g. Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), blocked per choice option 
(e.g., Ham,Van den Bos, & Van Doorn, 2009), or simultaneously (e.g., Newell, Wong, 
Cheung, & Rakow, 2009, Experiment 2), for a period of time. Some experiments asked 
participants to rate options rather than select amongst them (e.g., Lerouge, 2009). 
Following the information presentation participants make an immediate choice, engage in 
conscious thought, or engage in “unconscious thought.”  In the immediate choice 
condition, participants immediately rate or choose among the options available.  In the 
conscious thought and “unconscious thought” conditions participants were given a period 
of time to either think carefully about their decision or performed a distraction task for 
the same period of time.   
A meta-analysis of initial replications were not encouraging, with overall results 
indicating little to no effect of unconscious thought on normative decision making 
capacity (Acker, 2008).  A larger meta-analysis examining 92 studies of Unconscious 
Thought Theory claimed to confirm the existence of the unconscious thought effect, 




between the various studies (Strick, Dijksterhuis, Bos, Sjoerdsma, & van Baaren, 2011).  
This analysis noted that participants in a configural mindset, in which they are prepared 
to make an evaluation, are particularly sensitive to UTE.  This is in contrast to 
participants in a featural mindset, in which participants identify positive or negative 
attributes rather than making evaluative judgments about the sum of those attributes 
(Strick et al., 2011). Thus the mindset, as dictated by the activated goal-states, results in 
the outcome.  In contrast, a Bayesian meta-analysis was performed, in which a likelihood 
ratio (Bayes factor) was developed by comparing the probability of the data given the 
null against the probability of the data given a distribution of plausible alternate 
hypotheses (Newell & Rakow, 2011).  This analysis clearly supported the null 
hypothesis, indicating no effect of “unconscious thought” on outcomes.  These meta-
analyses, in addition to a variety of other published works, highlight methodological and 














Chapter 5: Methodological Problems with Studies of Unconscious Thought Theory 
Original research identifying and exploring Unconscious Thought Theory 
exposed participants to attributes (e.g. “Apartment ____ is fairly large”) surveyed to not 
have an extreme valence (Dijksterhuis, 2004, p. 589).  Valence, however, is not the only 
attribute variable that requires consideration, as participants in the survey indicated that 
certain attributes were more important than others: specifically, cost and size (p. 589).  
Thus, attributes used were of unequal weight, and the relative weighting of these 
attributes has not been validated cross-culturally.  Contexts surrounding housing 
availability and preference vary tremendously even b tween participants, so it stands to 
reason that individual preferences are likely to dictate the system of weights attached to 
attributes.  Replications using the original experimental materials avoided re-surveying 
sample populations to cross-validate claims of normative objectivity, instead using the 
same type of post-hoc decision analysis in the original work.  As a result, replication or 
nonreplication of effects could simply be due to geraphic trends in preference, rather 
than actually reflecting something about UTT.  This prevents the comparison of causal 
explanations, and complicates the meta-analytic proess.  Analysis of participant choice 
within the original work and replications determined individuals did differentiate between 
the “best” and “worst” options according to a simple accounting of good/bad attribute 
ratio (Dijksterhuis, 2004); group mean preference paired with experimenter-derived 
normative quality, however, is a poor way to measure the best decision among a set of 
alternatives.  To combat this, participants in a more recent replication weighed attributes 
in importance prior viewing attributions (Newell et al., 2009).  All participants, regardless 




producing a null effect.  In addition to using flawed stimulus materials, the effect size of 
the Unconscious Thought Effect has not been compared within a single sample 
population across different types of evaluative objects.   
One unexplored aspect of UTT is whether or not the same sample has similar 
effect sizes across stimuli-types. Although investigators have used different stimulus 
materials in some of the replications, the analysis of these replications have not measured 
the effect size of the UTE within the same subject pool.  Given that proponents of UTT 
attribute 2/3 of the variability in replication outcomes to methodological differences 
between the studies (Strick et. al., 2011), holding a subject pool and methodology 
constant across stimulus-types could ferret out any potential interactions or confounds.  
No differences in effect size across stimulus-types ar  expected if the process was 
functioning identically irrespective of stimuli-type, but this premise has never been 
tested.  As it turns out, there are many untested testable corollaries generated by UTT that 
have largely gone ignored by proponents of the theory.  This includes comparing effects 
attributed to UTE and those attributed to competing theories. 
Studies of UTT are unable to differentiate between the “Unconscious Thought 
Effect” and competing theories of cognition and perception that had been previously 
developed to explain automatic processes.  Using the example of the convergence-versus-
divergence principle, the ability to generate novel responses after performing a distraction 
task has been explored by researchers studying insight and creativity, and occurs in 
approximately 75% of experiments examining incubation (Dodds, Ward, & Smith, 2003).  
This has been termed the incubation effect, and is known to increase in response to how 




task is performed (Sio & Ormerod, 2009).  Although proponents of Unconscious Thought 
Theory have acknowledged that other theories explain such phenomena, they posit an 
alternative without detailing why the competing theory is insufficient.  This is in contrast 
to modern models of incubation effects, such as the forgetting-fixation hypothesis (Smith 
& Blankenship, 1989) and the returning-act hypothesis (Segal, 2004), both of which 
avoid assuming unseen mental activity while accounting for observed results.  The issue 
of importance here is that studies of UTT in no way differentiate between competing 
explanations incubation effects, while other work within the domain of creativity has.  
One final issue with the methodology employed by proponents of Unconscious 
Thought Theory is in the reporting of statistical significance.  Even in landmark studies, 
there was no statistically significant difference between the “conscious thought” and 
“unconscious thought” conditions (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiments 1 and 2), all three 
conditions (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment 3), goal-dependent and non-goal dependent 
conditions (Bos et al., 2008), and polarization andnon-polarization conditions 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment 4).  Significant correlations are often not significantly 
different from one another (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment 3), findings that are then 
referred to in passing in follow-up work without sufficient explanation (Djiksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006, p. 100).  In fact, proponents go so far as to quote the different “correct 
choice” percentages without reporting the lack of stati tical difference between the 
correlations (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, p. 97).  This sort of ideological run-around 
creates the appearance of intentional obfuscation, especially when investigators claim the 





Chapter 6: Theoretical Critiques of Unconscious Thought Theory 
Although the conscious-unconscious distinction is one with historical roots, some 
modern theories of judgment and decision-making dichotomize mental processes by 
modeling affect and cognition as dual processes in which affect has primacy (Zajonc, 
1998), while other models dichotomize reasoning processes into rule-based and 
associative, with the former being controlled and the latter automatic (Sloman, 1996). 
That said, any dichotomization must be viewed as purely metaphorical, as the distinctions 
drawn between processes is largely artificial.  This t eory effectively uses attention to 
bifurcate the conscious and unconscious mind, a pardigm that has largely fallen out of 
favor among experts in the field (e.g. Shiffrin, 1997, in Gonzalez-Vallejo et al., 2008).  
Encapsulating the fuzzy dichotomy between conscious and unconscious via attention is 
the cocktail-party problem, in which one can be in a large crowd of individuals and be 
oblivious to the conversations of others yet immediately attend when one hears an 
important or relevant piece of information, such as one’s own name (Cherry, 1953).  This 
demonstrates that nonattended stimuli can be processed consciously, preventing hard 
distinctions from being drawn between unconscious and conscious processing.  As the 
unconscious-conscious principle clearly delineates two modes of thought (conscious and 
unconscious), it leaves no room for continuum or parallel processing models that 
developed within the cognitive literature (Gonzalez-Vallejo, et al., 2008).  This principle 
is not the only one that reflects an extremely narrow and dated reading of the literature. 
The capacity principle also appears at first glance to be based on an old 
understanding of research into information processing that relies upon strong 




recitation of Miller’s research, which initially defined the 7 +/- 2 capacity rule for 
working memory in reference to chunks, rather than information units, to a calculation of   
total information processing capacity in terms of bits (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, pp. 
96-97).  They derive this calculation from seemingly nowhere, and footnote it so it is not 
“taken too literally.”  Literature contained within the forgetting-fixation hypothesis is 
then used to bolster this principle without in any way referencing the explanation 
originally used to explain the observations in the original research (e.g. Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991, in Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, p. 97).  Instead, an alternate 
hypothesis is put forward without explaining any sort of difference.  Ignoring the 
implications of prior research seems to be a recurring theme within the work of UTT 
theorists, and reflects analysis the weighting principle. 
The weighting principle has similar issues ignoring the implications of research 
conducted previously.  First, a number of experiments used as evidence for the weighting 
principle presuppose a natural system of weights that is “interfered with” by conscious 
thought (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, pp. 99-100).  They never experimentally 
validate the natural system of weights, and on its face this presents an a priori assumption 
on the part of the theorist.  To avoid relying on this assumption, certain methodologies 
allow participants to express their idiosyncratic weighting system by explicitly rating the 
importance of various attributes.  They selected choices that conformed to their attribute 
weights irrespective of decision-method (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment 3; Newell et al., 
2009).  If anything, observing UTE could simply be th result of a particular set of 




When subjective systems of weighting are controlled for, any Unconscious Thought 
Effect completely disappears. 
 The bottom-up-versus-top-down principle deals with the unconscious mind’s 
ability to engage in schematized thinking.  Proponents of UTT claim that, over time, 
unconscious processes slowly integrate information to form an “objective” holistic 
judgment (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, p. 98).  This is in contrast to the conscious 
mind’s much faster schema-guided top-down system of processing.  Top-down 
processing is discussed as equivalent to schema-guided processing, bottom-up to 
aschematic processing.  However, similar to the uncons ious-conscious distinction, 
systems of processing typically use both top-down and bottom-up processes to complete 
an action.  Categorization, by its nature a system of schematization, uses both top-down 
and bottom-up systems to go about processing information (Barsalou, 1992).  This is the 
case with the vast majority of cognitions; top-down and bottom-up processes converge to 
form a judgment, and use both process types constantly.  Strict delineations between the 
two process types do not exist, creating questions about the assumption underlying the 
principle.  A corollary of the bottom-up-versus-top-down principle is that those in the 
unconscious thought condition would produce more polarized views, and an experiment 
looking for polarization affirms this prediction (see Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment 4 in 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, p. 100) even though null results were obtained 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004, p. 594).  Given that participants across a number of experiments 
produce more polarized evaluations of stimulus objects after engaging in conscious 
thought, rather than performing a distraction task, this is expected (Chaiken & Yates, 




quantity of empirically supported theoretical research that directly contradicts this 
principle, this principle is likely not a replicable effect. 
The rule principle claims activated goal-states determine whether or not rules are 
conformed to or not, drawing a distinction between co forming to and actively following 
rules (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, p. 101).  This doesn’t explain why other rule-based 
thought cannot occur when relevant goal-states are activated and rules need to be used 
(e.g. arithmetic).  In different works, UTT proponents state that arithmetic rules cannot be 
used, citing research examining the effect of distraction tasks on ability to solve 
arithmetic problems (e.g. Betsch et al., 2001 in Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  To test 
this principle, participants were exposed to stimulus digits paired with a subliminally 
presented instruction to add or subtract (Ric & Muller, 2012).  Participants were able to 
identify digits that corresponded to the subliminal i structions significantly faster than 
those in the control condition, in which no instrucion was provided.  In direct 
contradiction to the rule principle, automatic processes can use proposition-based 
reasoning.  Moreover, the corollaries of the rule principle are not consistent with the 
experimental methodology employed by proponents of UTT.  Studies in which 
participants are demonstrated to be unable to encod negated attributions are used to 
demonstrate the inability of unconscious thought to foll w rules more generally with the 
“not” modifying acting as a rule (Deutsch et al., 2006).  In these experiments, participants 
simply encode negated terms as non-negated versions of the same terms, flipping the 
valence of the attribution.  The absence of this effect in the UTT paradigm is explained 
away with the statement that the unconscious can process negated attributions as long as 




state prior to stimulus exposure or prior to unconsious thought itself.  Unfortunately, this 
claim is wildly divergent from results arrived at in the studies used to support it, as 
participants in both the goal-directed and non-goal-directed conditions performed with 
equal efficacy on the decision task (e.g. Bos, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2008).  The 
rule principle simply doesn’t make sense, nor is itsupported by a comprehensive view of 
the relevant literature and studies.  In contrast, the convergence-versus-divergence 
principle is a phenomena supported by the literature, but again the causal explanation 
varies wildly from established precedent. 
The convergence-versus-divergence principle, similar to the capacity principle, is 
based on a dated understanding of research, this time in the domain of decision-making 
and judgment.  Experiments studying functional fixedn ss have demonstrated the effect 
of distraction on creative output, describing the pr cise phenomenon attributed to the 
power of unconscious thought.  Fixation is defined as something that blocks the 
successful completion of cognitive operations, in this case the generation of novel output 
or insight (Smith, 2003).  When individuals are faced with a problem, they will engage a 
solution strategy that is determined to be appropriate for the task at hand.  Over time 
individuals become habituated to certain types of pr blems that are paired with certain 
types of strategies; to conserve resources and act in n efficient and timely manner, 
preexisting processes attenuated to past experiences are employed.  These preexisting 
processes can be referred to as a mental set, and they contain within them a number of 
implicit assumptions regarding the nature of the problem at hand (Smith, 2003).  As 
mental sets are attenuated to particular problem types, activating an inappropriate mental 




and the judgments regarding its contextual appropriateness are entirely implicit rather 
than explicit, fixation on a particular strategy can be difficult to explicitly identify and 
correct for.  A distraction task, however, can break the fixation and allow for an 
alternative solution strategy to be used (Dodds & Smith, 1999; Smith & Blankenship, 
1991; Smith & Vela, 1991).  Instead of relying on unproven constructs like “unconscious 
thought,” however, the divergence observed in tests of UTT is simple the result of a 
mental set shift occurring as a result of the distraction task.  Rather than something 
actively happening (unconscious thought) something is no longer happening (fixation).  
The scope of the current study hopes to eliminate some of the methodological problems 




Chapter 7: Scope of Current Study 
Study 1 measures the extremity of the valence of the a tributions used in Study 2.  
Participants will be making decisions based on different sets of stimuli, so if the effect of 
the decision-making condition is to be examined the stimuli must be treated by 
participants as functionally identical.  Study 2 seeks to replicate and extend the effects 
observed in the Unconscious Thought Theory paradigm while improving experimental 
methodology and correcting for potential confounds to internal validity.  In opposition to 
most previous replications, normative judgments of “worst,” “average,” and “best” 
derived from positive/negative attribute ratios have been abandoned in favor of 
judgments based on subjective attribute importance provided by participants.  Whether 
individuals are choosing among apartments, cars, or roommates, there can be no 
objective system of weights that account for the variety of preferences that exist.  It is 
easy to see how various attributes, e.g. the amount of space, could vary wildly in 
importance depending on the personal or geographical istory of the participant. An 
individual who grew up in a rural area could very well be motivated by space concerns to 
the exclusion of others while a poor individual could be motivated first by cost, and this 
sort of variability in preference prevents strong con lusions about UTT from being 
drawn.  In an effort to prevent this from confounding results, participants will engage in a 
weighting exercise prior to stimulus exposure similar to a well-conducted replication 
(Newell et al., 2009, Experiment 2).  Summed rankings reflect a personal system of 
weights, and choice outcomes in a number of object-type and decision-method conditions 




The primary issue of importance is in determining whether or not the protocol 
implemented is sufficiently similar to an insight problem to benefit from incubation 
effects.  Predicted outcomes are derived from reseach on incubation effects (Sio & 
Omerond, 2009).  It is predicted that those in the “unconscious thought” condition will be 
more likely than the conscious thought or immediate decision conditions to select an 
option that conforms to their system of weights.  Fixation ought to occur in the conscious 
thought condition thus reducing the quality of judgment, with the immediate choice 
condition faring worst due to reliance on the most recent attributions.  A distraction task 
allows decay to occur, and thus prevents fixation fr m constraining evaluative capacity.  
Because these effects are expected to be robust to object-type, no interaction is predicted 
between the object being evaluated and the decision method being used.  Meta-analysis 
of incubation effects research produced a mean effect size of .08, and thus sets the basis 
for the prediction of the effect size in this study.  Alternatively, if the protocol is not 
sufficiently similar to an insight problem, null eff cts will be obtained.  This would 
mirror results observed elsewhere (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment 3; Newell, et al., 






Chapter 8: Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 39 participants were used to validate th stimulus items to be 
used in Study 2. Participants were gathered from general psychology courses at the 
University of Central Oklahoma and received partial course credit for completing the 
experiment.   
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was hosted online using Qualtrics, an online survey software 
developed for the social sciences (Qualtrics, Provo, UT), and participants signed up for 
the experiment using Sona System.  Participants were informed that they would be 
viewing a series of statements about different objects, and that they would be asked to 
rate how positive or negative the statement is on a1-10 scale, with 1 being extremely 
negative and 10 being extremely positive.  Participants viewed 24 attributions in 
counterbalanced blocks of 12 for 3 different object categories, rating the extremity of 
valence on a 1-10 Likert-type scale.  All attributions rated by participants can be found in 
Appendices A-B. 
Results and Discussion 
Because Study 2 will be using three different sets of stimuli pertaining to different 
types of objects to determine the effect of different decision-making conditions on 
participant choice, it must be ensured that participants view the relative importance and 
valence of each set of attributions equally.  If the stimuli are to be used interchangeably, 




roommate) was used as the categorical independent variable.   Attribution ratings were 
summed for each object category generating a continuous dependent variable. A one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run, and the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was met.  It was found that stimulus condition had a marginally significant effect on 
summed participant ratings, F(2, 109) = 3.05, p = .051, partial eta-squared = .053.  
Pairwise comparisons demonstrated the summed rating for statements about apartments 
(M = 128.24, SD = 10.40) was significantly lower than the summed rating for statements 
about potential roommates (M = 134.05, SD = 10.55).  This is, in a way, expected, as 
evaluations regarding other individuals are likely to be slightly more forgiving than 
evaluations of mere objects or potential living quarters.  There were no other significant 
differences.  While these results are not perfect, the relatively small effect size 
(accounting for ~5.3% of variance) and the overall lack of statistical significance in the 










Chapter 9: Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 57 participants were gathered from general psychology courses at the 
University of Central Oklahoma and received partial course credit for completing the 
experiment.  A total of 4 participants with incomplete weightings were excluded from the 
second analysis but not the first. 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was hosted online using Qualtrics, an online survey software 
developed for the social sciences (Qualtrics, Provo, UT), and participants signed up for 
the experiment using Sona System.  Prior to being exposed to the stimulus, participants 
will rank the importance of various attributes in relation to a decision among a number of 
object-alternatives.  The sum of the positive attributes for a particular object-alternative 
will be used to rank the relative desirability of each object-alternative that is presented.  
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable derived from an analysis of whether 
participants within a decision condition selected an object-alternative that conformed to 
the participant’s personal weighing system.  An additional analysis will be used to 
determine the relative probability of participants selecting the “normatively better 
option,” the same analysis performed in a variety of studies examining UTT (Dijksterhuis 
2004, Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). 
After the attribute importance ranking task, participants began the immediate 
choice condition paired with the apartment object-type, and were randomly exposed to 48 




were told they will see attributes of four apartments and will need to form an impression 
to make a choice later.  The apartments were labeled with atypical characters as opposed 
to numbers or letters to avoid any potential order effects.  Apartments were described 
using positive and negative phrases (e.g., “above average size,” “no dishwasher”).  
Positive and negative attributes of each apartment will be presented to participants one at 
a time for four seconds each, with 48 attributes randomly presented in total.  Participants 
in the original studies were expected to select among apartments with a ratio of good/bad 
attributions of 3/9, 6/6, or 9/3, with a higher good/bad ratio indicating a “normatively 
better choice” (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  Objections have been raised questioning the 
existence of truly normative standards of assessment, and to correct for this participants 
will instead be comparing the likelihood of a particular choice to how well it conforms to 
the weighting system identified at the beginning of the experiment.  After being exposed 
to the attributions participants were immediately asked to make a selection among the 
apartments. 
Following the immediate choice condition, participants experienced the 
conscious-deliberation condition paired with the car stimulus items.  Participants 
randomly viewed a total of 48 attributions for 4 seconds each regarding a number of 
vehicles (e.g. “Hatsdun has good gas mileage,” “Dasuki has no cupholders”).  After 
exposure participants were given three minutes to “very carefully think” about each of the 
four cars.  The time remaining was displayed on the computer screen with no other items; 




In the “unconscious thought” condition, participants were told to form an impression of a 
potential roommate and then randomly viewed 48 stimulus items for 4 seconds each 
regarding a that person (e.g. “Roommate A has interesting friends,” “Roommate D 
sometimes leaves dirty dishes in the sink.”  After exposure, participants performed a 
neutrally valenced sentence unscramble task (Vess, 2012, Appendix F) for 3 minutes.  
Participants were presented with a series of 5 words ut-of-order, and were instructed to 
use 4 of those 5 words to form a sentence.  After participants worked on the task for three 
minutes, they were asked to determine which of the roommates they preferred.  All 
attributions for each choice alternative are listed in Appendices C-E. 
Results 
Two sets of results were analyzed to determine whether the independent variable 
decision-condition (immediate, conscious thought, unconscious thought) had a significant 
impact on participant selection.  In an attempt to replicate the original results 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004), decisions were analyzed to determine whether or not participants 
selected previously identified “normatively better options.”  These were options with the 
greatest “good attribution” to “bad attribution” ratio.  A dependent variable called 
“match” was created, and if participants selected the “normatively best option” it was 
coded as a 1, whereas if they selected any other option it was coded as a 0.  An ANOVA 
revealed a marginally significant effect of condition on decision, F(2, 164) = 2.42, p = 
.091, partial eta-squared = .029, observed power = .48.  Upon performing Tukey pairwise 
analyses, a marginally significant difference was identified between the conscious 




thought condition slightly more likely to select the experimenter-selected option (M = 
.60, SD = .49) than those in the conscious thought (M = .39, SD = .49) condition. 
In the second set of analyses, participant decisions were compared not to the 
experimenter selected “normatively better option,” but rather took into account the 
system of personal weights identified in the first part of the experimental procedure.  
Weighted values were either added or subtracted from an “object index” that represented 
the relative desirability of each option. In each category the object indexes were 
compared to one another, with highest object index indicated the best alternative for each 
participant.  A new variable, “pref_match” was created as the dependent variable.  If a 
participant selected an option that coincided with the highest object index value, 
“pref_match” was coded as a 1.  If they selected any other option it was coded as a 0.  A 
3x1 ANOVA was run, and once individual preferences w re taken into account the 
relationship between decision condition and the outc me non-significant, F(2, 158) = .97, 
p = .38, observed power = .22.  Participants in the conscious thought condition were more 
likely to select options that coincided with their pre-stated weighting schemes (M = .63, 
SD = .49) than either the immediate choice condition (M = .51, SD = .50) or the 
unconscious thought condition (M = .52, SD = .50), but the differences were not 
statistically significant. 
Discussion  
The analyses above are revealing, precisely mirroring the foundational work in 
UTT while considerably reducing its significance.  If participants’ individual weighting 
schemes are ignored, they are marginally more likely to select the experimenter-identified 




thought condition.  This is in line with the original experiments identifying and exploring 
UTT – differences specifically between those two conditions with a small effect size 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  This, however, is not evidence for 
a “natural” system of normative judgment.  While thre was variation between 
conditions, that variation was statistically insignificant and only serves to indicate mean 
preferences differ among the general population, a set of “normative” preferences that 
cannot account for the decisions individuals make. 
 Upon taking into account individualized weighting schemes, all significance in 
favor of the unconscious thought effect disappears.  This is also in line with research 
testing UTT after controlling for individual systems of weighting (Newell et al., 2009).  
Moreover, by keeping the participants consistent betwe n conditions there is compelling 
data from Study 2 to suggest a potential benefit to purposeful conscious thought in 
evaluating options, though the extent of the effect would need to be further explored in 
future studies.  Regardless, effect sizes will likely be small enough to state simply that 
people, for the most part, make choices that are larg ly consistent with their stated 
preferences.  If given more time to evaluate the options they are given, participants may 
be more likely to make a decision that aligns with the option that best suits them.  While 
neither a surprising nor groundbreaking discovery, the result is intuitive, and does not 
require the acceptance of a number of hypothetical constructs underlying UTT, such as: 
clearly delineated dual-process models of cognition, a “hidden unconscious” akin to an 
iceberg, “naturalistic systems of weighting,” an atten ional “spotlight,” or any other 




homunculus pulling the levers, there are no clockwor  gnomes inputting perceptual data 
into a grand computational device. 
These results cast tremendous doubt on the claims made by proponents of UTT, 
as they are attempting to describe a phenomenon that doesn’t exist. As a science, 
psychology ought to put to bed the dichotomy between th  “conscious” and “unconscious 
mind,” as though the functioning of an intact human mi d is somehow separable in that 
sense. It is not some divisible construct, actively in motion, with attention bifurcating the 
line between different aspects of daily experience.  Although the unconscious-conscious 
dichotomy has been expanded in the automaticity literature to align more with a 
continuum model, any attempt to utilize a metaphorical “attentional spotlight” as the 
primary driver of subjective experience – implying that there is a measure of unseen 
“movement” occurring under the surface via some sort of secondary processor separable 
from experience, cannot explain the human behavior and decision-making. 
Research produced by UTT proponents also attempts to demonstrate the increased degree 
of satisfaction experienced by individuals who make  decision after a period of 
distraction rather than having engaged in conscious thought (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).  
Here, proponents of UTT are conflating feelings of atisfaction with actual satisfaction 
generated by the quality of the choice.  Carefully evaluating choices requires an 
exploration of both the positive and negative aspects of any option, and any carefully 
considered decision that is made would be based in part on knowingly subjective 
appraisals of those aspects.  Given that most people are aware of their own subjectivity 
and fallibility to degree (at least insofar as they r cognize their preferences don’t 




and this doubt manifests as a lower level of sureness or satisfaction in the decision that is 
made.  Although thorough assessment of various pros and cons may result in more strife 
over the short-term, long-term satisfaction with a decision should intuitively be the result 
of measured evaluation and appraisal of alternatives and how those alternatives 
eventually segue into outcomes.  In a sense, proponents of UTT are advocating for a 
modified chosen version of the Dunning-Krueger effect; keep yourself ignorant to the 
actual consequences of your decision, and you will probably be happier with it due to 
your lack of awareness of alternatives.  Put simply, advocates of UTT are unknowingly 
trying to prove that ignorance is bliss. 
 Future studies could include a much larger sample size in order to parse out even 
the smallest of effects.  Given how the data was trending once individual weightings were 
taken into account, additional experimentation would likely reveal a more beneficial 
effect to conscious thought in the act of evaluative decision-making.  Moreover, due to 
the lack of control over the participants’ immediate ecosystem in online experiments, 
control for environmental variables was extremely limited.  Although this likely did not 
significantly affect outcomes, future research ought to take place in a more controlled 
environment.  However, given the overall lack of veridicality of the UTT paradigm 
additional exploration should only serve to further invalidate the model. 
 Limitations include the small and homogenous sample size of students, and a lack 
of local variability in preferences.  If the study were done in other areas of the country 
that would more realistically reflect different preference profiles, such as in a more rural 
environment rather than a suburban one, outcomes in the initial analysis could be 




people make decisions that align with what they want – ot what is necessarily best, or 
most effective, or anything else. 
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Positive Apartment Attributes Negative Apartment Attributes 
Rent is cheaper than comparable 
apartments 
Rent is more expensive than comparable 
apartments 
Short walk to places you frequent Long drive to places you frequent 
Above average size Average in size 
Heating bill is average Heating bill is high 
Has air conditioning No air conditioning 
Has a dishwasher No dishwasher 
Attractive interior and exterior Okay looking interior and exterior 
New Old 
Quiet Somewhat noisy 
Free high speed Internet High speed Internet not included 
Reserved parking space next to building Parking available on street only 
Landlord is friendly Landlord is unfriendly 
 
Positive Car Attributes Negative Car Attributes 
The Hatsdun has good mileage The Nabusi has poor mileage 
The Hatsdun has good handling The Nabusi has poor handling 
The Hatsdun has a large trunk The Nabusi has a small trunk 
The Hatsdun is new The Nabusi is old 
The Hatsdun is available in many 
different colors  
The Nabusi is available in many different 
colors  
For the Hatsdun service is excellent For the Nabusi service is poor 
The Hatsdun has plenty of leg room The Nabusi has little leg room 
With the Hatsdun it is easy to shift gears 
With the Nabusi it is difficult to shift 
gears 
The Hatsdun has cupholders The Nabusi has no cupholders 
The Hatsdun has a sunroof The Nabusi has no sunroof 
The Hatsdun is relatively good for the 
environment 
The Nabusi is not very good for the 
environment 









Positive Roommate Attributions Negative Roommate Attributions 
Has good grades in school Has low grades in school 
Has a variety of interests Does not have a variety of interests 
Is a good cook Is not a good cook 
Has nice friends Has friends that are somewhat boring 
Takes care of his/her appearance Does not take care of his/her appearance 
Has a good income Does not have a good income 
Has similar tastes to you Does not have similar tastes to you 
Is fun to be with Is not fun to be with 
Is a relaxed and easygoing person Is a bit uptight 
Has sense of humor Does not have a sense of humor 
Does not leave dirty dishes in the sink Sometimes leaves dirty dishes in the sink 




















Apartment  Apartment  
Rent is cheaper than comparable 
apartments 
Rent is more expensive than comparable 
apartments 
Short walk to places you frequent Long drive to places you frequent 
Average size Above average in size 
Heating bill is average Heating bill is high 
No air conditioning Has air conditioning 
Has a dishwasher No dishwasher 
Attractive interior and exterior Okay looking interior and exterior 
New Old 
Quiet Somewhat noisy 
Free high speed Internet High speed Internet not included 
Reserved parking space next to building Parking available on street only 
Landlord is unfriendly Landlord is friendly 
 
Apartment  Apartment   
Rent is cheaper than comparable 
apartments 
Rent is more expensive than comparable 
apartments 
Long drive to places you frequent Short walk to places you frequent 
Above average in size Average size 
Heating bill is high Heating bill is average 
Has air conditioning No air conditioning 
Has a dishwasher No dishwasher 
Attractive interior and exterior Okay looking interior and exterior 
Old New 
Somewhat noisy Quiet 
High speed Internet not included Free high speed Internet included 
Parking available on street only Reserved parking space next to building 











The Hatsdun has good mileage The Kaiwa has good mileage 
The Hatsdun has good handling The Kaiwa has poor handling 
The Hatsdun has a large trunk The Kaiwa has a largetrunk 
The Hatsdun is new The Kaiwa is old 
The Hatsdun is available in many 
different colors  
The Kaiwa is available in many different 
colors  
For the Hatsdun service is excellent For the Kaiwa service is excellent 
The Hatsdun has little leg room The Kaiwa has plenty of leg room 
With the Hatsdun it is difficult to shift 
gears 
With the Kaiwa it is easy to shift gears 
The Hatsdun has cupholders The Kaiwa has no cupholders 
The Hatsdun has a sunroof The Kaiwa has no sunroof 
The Hatsdun is relatively good for the 
environment 
The Kaiwa is fairly good for the 
environment 
The Hatsdun has a poor sound system The Kaiwa has apoor sound system 
 
Dasuka Nabusi 
The Dasuka has poor mileage The Nabusi has poor mileage 
The Dasuka has good handling The Nabusi has poor handling 
The Dasuka has a small trunk The Nabusi has a small trunk 
The Dasuka is new The Nabusi is old 
The Dasuka is available in very few 
colors  
The Nabusi is available in many different 
colors  
For the Dasuka service is poor For the Nabusi servic  is poor 
The Dasuka has little leg room The Nabusi has plenty of leg room 
With the Dasuka it is easy to shift gears 
With the Nabusi it is difficult to shift 
gears 
The Dasuka has cupholders The Nabusi has no cupholders 
The Dasuka has a sunroof The Nabusi has a sunroof 
The Dasuka is not very good for the 
environment 
The Nabusi is not very good for the 
environment 








Roommate  Roommate  
Has good grades in school Has good grades in school 
Does not have a variety of interests Has a variety of interests 
Is a good cook Is not a good cook 
Has nice friends Has nice friends 
Takes care of his/her appearance Does not take care of his/her appearance 
Has a good income Has a good income 
Does not have similar tastes to you Does not have similar tastes to you 
Is fun to be with Is not fun to be with 
Is a relaxed and easygoing person Is a bit uptight 
Does not have sense of humor Has a sense of humor 
Sometimes leaves dirty dishes in the sink Sometimes leaves dirty dishes in the sink 
Plays pleasant music while at home Plays pleasant music while at home 
 
Roommate  Roommate  
Has low grades in school Has good grades in school 
Has a variety of interests Does not have a variety of interests 
Is not a good cook Is a good cook 
Has friends that are somewhat boring Has friends that are somewhat boring 
Does not take care of his/her appearance Takes care of his/her appearance 
Does not have a good income Does not have a good inc me 
Has similar interests to you Has similar tastes to you 
Is not fun to be with Is fun to be with 
Is a bit uptight Is a relaxed and easy-going person 
Has a sense of humor Does not have a sense of humor 
Does not leave dirty dishes in the sink Does not leave dirty dishes in the sink 











Instructions: Please construct a grammatically correct sentence using only four of the 
five words you are given. 
 
1.   ranch likes the he headed   __________________ _____________ 
2.   shampoo uses flag green she  _______________________________ 
3.   turtle laptop walks the slowly  _________________________________ 
4.   carpet Judy cleans the stumped  _______________________________ 
5.   judged performance sticks he their ________________________________ 
6.   bulbs plants lamps have light  ________________________________ 
7.   chirped loudly robin the phone  ______________ __________________ 
8.   plant water gravy needs the  ____________________________________ 
9.   staples the paper she relaxed  _______________________________ 
10. the hat big is wooded   ____________________________________ 
11. window cracked is the televisions ________________________________ 
12. carpet vacuumed he pan the  _______________________________ 
13. green the grass is pusher   _______________________________ 
 
 
